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Abstract. Price differentiation describes a marketing strategy to deter-
mine the price of goods on the basis of a potential customer’s attributes
like location, financial status, possessions, or behavior. Several cases of
online price differentiation have been revealed in recent years. For exam-
ple, different pricing based on a user’s location was discovered for online
office supply chain stores and there were indications that offers for hotel
rooms are priced higher for Apple users compared to Windows users at
certain online booking websites. One potential source for relevant dis-
tinctive features are system fingerprints, i. e., a technique to recognize
users’ systems by identifying unique attributes such as the source IP ad-
dress or system configuration.
In this paper, we shed light on the ecosystem of pricing at online plat-
forms and aim to detect if and how such platform providers make use
of price differentiation based on digital system fingerprints. We designed
and implemented an automated price scanner capable of disguising itself
as an arbitrary system, leveraging real-world system fingerprints, and
searched for price differences related to different features (e. g., user lo-
cation, language setting, or operating system). This system allows us to
explore price differentiation cases and expose those characteristic fea-
tures of a system that may influence a product’s price.
1 Introduction
Pricing policies of (online) business providers are typically not transparent to
customers and are based on parameters that a customer is not aware of. This
opens up a number of opportunities for so-called price differentiation and price
discrimination. Price differentiation is a pricing policy in which providers de-
mand different prices for the same asset, including special offers or discounts.
In contrast, adjusting a product’s price based on a customer’s personal infor-
mation (e. g., gender, wealth, home address, or other feature) is called price dis-
crimination. In the past, suspected cases of online price discrimination captured
headlines, including different pricing at Staples based on a user’s location [14]
and indications that offers for hotel rooms are priced higher for Apple users
compared to Windows users at Orbitz [20].
From a technical point of view, an online platform can leverage many kinds
of techniques to identify a user, which would be the starting point for price
discrimination. Generally speaking, the term fingerprinting refers to the pro-
cess of obtaining characteristic attributes of a system and determining attribute
values that can be leveraged to recognize or identify a single system among oth-
ers. In the context of online user tracking, this technique complements cookie-
based recognition, which has been ubiquitously deployed for many years [4].
In practice, browser fingerprinting provides more information about a customer
compared to cookie-based methods, including software attributes (i.e., the used
user-agent, installed plugins, and supported mimetypes [1, 19, 5, 15]). Previous
research demonstrated that browser-based system fingerprinting performs well
for most types of commodity systems such as desktop computers and mobile
devices [24, 4, 11].
Our assumption is that information about a user’s system—obtained via
browser fingerprinting—is leveraged by online providers for price discrimination
as it leaks information about the system configuration and the user himself.
While flight tickets have been found to be subject to too many influence factors
to be able to identify methodical price discrimination [28], there has been no
systematic investigation of the existence of systematic price discrimination in
online commerce. In particular, hotel booking websites are often criticized for
non-transparent pricing and have been suspected of price differentiation. Unfor-
tunately, not all details about leveraged price differentiation mechanisms can be
determined without detailed insight into the inner working of such platforms,
and thus we need to adopt a black-box strategy to explore abnormalities.
In this paper, we apply real-world browser fingerprints to simulate differ-
ent systems and analyze corresponding price changes. To achieve this goal, we
implemented an automated price scanner capable of disguising itself as an ar-
bitrary system leveraging real-world system fingerprints and searched for price
differences related to (i) user location represented by the IP address, (ii) specific
systems represented by their fingerprints, and (iii) single features of fingerprints.
This enables us to expose the impact of these features on asset prices. Generally
speaking, we aim to expose system configuration features that may influence
prices and perform a repeatable empirical analysis to measure the effects of
fingerprint changes.
In an empirical study, we examined several accommodation booking websites
and a rental car provider platform to identify which parameters affect an asset’s
price. Our results show the existence of location-based price differentiation while
price changes based on system fingerprints are found in single cases and do not
reveal systematic discrimination. We also shed light on how changing single at-
tributes in a system fingerprint affects an asset’s price. Associating reproducible
price changes with specific attribute values allows users to change their system
fingerprint and start hunting for the best prices for hotel rooms.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
– We developed and implemented a method to find and analyze price differ-
entiation by automatically testing different system configurations against
online providers.
– We conducted an empirical study to explore price differentiation based on
user location and system configuration.
– We provide insights into which specific system features influence pricing
strategies and how a user can potentially affect them.
Our study is published on the 8th ACM Conference on Data and Application
Security and Privacy [12]. This report provides additional information and de-
tails of our work. To foster additional research on price differentiation, examples
of online price discrimination detected by our analysis framework are available
at https://rawgit.com/ananonymousauthor/examples/master/index.html.
2 Price Discrimination via System Fingerprinting
First we introduce both price discrimination and system fingerprinting in more
detail and explain why and how both concepts are related to each other.
2.1 Price Discrimination
As noted above, there is a small yet important difference between price discrim-
ination and price differentiation: while price differentiation describes a strategy
to determine a product’s or service’s price based on a potential customer’s needs,
it does not depend on a customer’s characteristics. In price discrimination, how-
ever, the price is determined on the basis of a potential customer’s attributes,
such as location, financial status, possessions, gender, or behavior. According to
Varian [27], price discrimination is defined as specific pricing for specific groups
and has been a common technique since 1920. Traditionally, price discrimination
and differentiation can be subdivided into three different degrees [27]:
First degree: Involves individualization of prices for all customers. Second
degree: Prices differ based on additional services. It is possible to distinguish
between service-related, quantitative, and price-pack forms. Third degree: In-
volves individual prices for groups of people. They can be individual, location,
or time-related.
In most parts of the world, businesses may lawfully set a price for a specific
customer, like discounts based on negotiations or special offers. While this is
legal business conduct and in most cases handled responsibly, it verges on inap-
propriate practice if and when a retailer may be able to adjust an offer’s price
based on a customer’s mindset, ethnicity, or residential neighborhood.
Online commerce has widely been resistant to price discrimination as cus-
tomers typically decide to buy a product for the lowest price possible. Further-
more, few customer characteristics were customarily revealed during an online
purchase (like residential area) and there are usually no negotiations (at least for
standard products). Today, however, a client’s computer system reveals more in-
formation about its user [4, 24, 11, 1]. This presents new opportunities for online
shop operators to personalize their content for each individual customer [18, 16].
From their perspective, price discrimination is a way to maximize their profits
and thus they have an incentive to utilize such techniques.
To implement such a strategy, they can use system fingerprinting methods to
identify user groups that are likely willing to pay more than other user groups.
In the following section, we investigate how particular fingerprinting attributes
may lead to price changes for the same product.
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Fig. 1. Every system yields its own fingerprint: different features are extracted from a
system and stored in a provider’s database
2.2 System Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting is a technique to obtain characteristic attributes of a given sys-
tem, enabling the recognition or identification of a single system among others.
While this is a general method and can be applied to different kinds of systems,
including servers, mobile devices, or websites, we focus in this work on client-side
systems, especially browsers on commodity systems like desktop computers and
smartphones. This approach enables Web platform providers to fingerprint—and
consequently recognize or identify—a user’s system and improves on classical
cookie-based user tracking to enhance the reliability of tracking techniques [24].
In practice, the attributes of a system are examined and analyzed if they
are unique compared to the attributes of other systems. Such characteristic at-
tributes serve as so-called features that can be used to create a fingerprint that
is as unique as possible. At the same time, these fingerprints ought to remain
stable over time. Consequently, every system is assigned a fingerprint which de-
scribes the system’s characteristic attributes (e. g., configuration items like a
browser’s settings, display size, or the IP address). This concept is illustrated in
Figure 1. As our work is in the context of online shopping, we focus on attributes
accessible from the Web and hence use browser attributes as our browser finger-
prints. Common browsers reveal adequate information to generate this kind of
fingerprint [24], and web-based fingerprinting of personal computers and mobile
devices is a common technique that has been investigated by other researchers [4,
24, 11, 17, 30].
Figure 2 provides an example of a JavaScript approach to system fingerprint-
ing. In particular, it shows the implementation of browser fingerprinting at the
hotel booking platform hrs.com. The code loads after the system visits the land-
ing page; it builds a HTTP GET request with fingerprint features (UserAgent,
language, etc.) resulting in the link shown in the lower half of the figure.
A website provider can easily obtain a browser’s attributes and settings,
which are used to create a system fingerprint. Consequently, if a system re-visits
// JavaScript Code:
var clientDataParamString=’?track=ci’+’&saw=’
+screen.availWidth+’&sah=’+screen.availHeight+’&scd=’
+screen.colorDepth+’&nua=’+navigator.userAgent
+’&np=’+navigator.platform+’&nl=’+navigator.language
+’&nce=’+navigator.cookieEnabled+’&nan=’
+navigator.appName+’&cookie=’+cookieTestResultCode
+’&sess=’+’08C191CD9A170B5B54FCFC8F656D9449.61-4’;
var clientDataPixel=document.createElement(’img’);
clientDataPixel.src=’bi/null.gif’+clientDataParamString;
document.body.appendChild(clientDataPixel);
// Resulting link:
http://www.hrs.com/web3/bi/null.gif?track=ci&saw=<width>&
sah=<height>&scd=<colordepth>&nua=<userAgent>&np=<platform>&
nl=<language>&nce=<cookiesEnabled>&nan=<appName>&
cookie=<cookieTest>&sess=<sessionId>
Fig. 2. Exemplary JavaScript code snippet of system fingerprinting and tracking at
hrs.com
the provider’s website, it is possible to recognize this specific system with the
help of its fingerprint. Additionally, a fingerprint yields valuable information
about the system itself. For instance, it tells a provider the system’s browser,
supported mime-types, installed plugins, and more. Such information can be a
potential source for price discrimination. The fact that a website provider is able
to obtain fingerprint information leads us to assume that this information might
be used to group website visitors and may give some groups different prices
compared to other groups. This would, as we understand it, represent a case of
price discrimination.
3 Searching for Price Discrimination
Below, we outline goals, workflow, and functionality of our method for searching
the Web for potential cases of price discrimination.
3.1 Design Goals
Our main goal is to conduct a systematic study as well as an objective analysis
to clarify the existence of online price discrimination based either on location
information or on system configuration. Therefore, we define the following goals
for our implementation of systematic, non-offensive scans.
Fingerprint Variety. We intend to send realistic search requests to the exam-
ined websites, which requires the application of real-world system fingerprints.
Major fingerprinting libraries found in the wild utilize browser features as char-
acteristic attributes to recognize and classify users’ systems [11, 1]. Therefore,
fingerprints should be as comprehensive and complete as possible, including user
agent information as well as every system feature that could be used by common
fingerprinting libraries (see Sec. 3.3).
Simulation of User Behavior. In order to avoid being classified as a bot or even
getting blocked by a provider due to automated crawling of their platforms, we
strive for realistic user behavior. Hence, it is necessary to simulate human be-
havior when posting a search request: starting at the landing page of a provider’s
website, filling out the search input form (e. g., in case of hotels, with the de-
sired travel information like arrival and departure dates), and traversing the
received results. Because any possible price individualization has to take place
before listing the results, fingerprinting is likely applied during this procedure.
By simulating user behavior, we increase our chances of being fingerprinted (see
Sec. 3.4).
Robustness. The scan results are external data to us. Hence, we cannot control
them and the way they are deployed, e. g., their format or display position. For
this reason, we have to ensure the proper handling of exceptions and any kind
of unexpected data to avoid crashes.
Deterministic Behavior. To compare different prices and scanning results, our
system has to be deterministic, meaning that the same search requests using
the same input parameters should lead to the same result. Note that external
circumstances (e. g., seasonal vacancies, special offers, or a fully booked hotel)
might influence product prices and pose a limitation to our work (see Sec. 5).
We try to minimize their influence by leveraging repeated scans and vacancy
filters (see Sec. 4).
Besides these design goals, we also follow three additional principles. First, as
we aim to include multiple platforms in our study, the implementation needs to
be modular. For every scan, the platforms, search parameters, fingerprints, etc.
can be chosen freely, which also enables us to extend the system with additional
scrapers so more websites and product categories may be scanned for fingerprint-
based price discrimination in future work. Second, we should not send too many
requests to a given website at once. As we certainly do not want to disturb
legitimate services, we apply a time delay to our low-traffic implementation and
hence ensure that our scans will be tolerable to platform providers and do not
interfere with their daily business. Third, we want to be transparent about our
work and thus plan to publish the code and data obtained by our scanning
practice. Researchers interested in this field and our study will thus be able to
reproduce our results as well as make enhanced evaluations on their own.
3.2 High-level Overview of Workflow
We begin by providing a high-level overview of the system’s workflow (see Fig-
ure 3). We have two data sources (system fingerprints and provider websites),
three data processors (scanner, scraper, and price analysis), and result data
(cases of price discrimination).
First, we build system profiles, each including four components: (i) a real-
world fingerprint, (ii) a proxy server to be used, (iii) search parameters, such as
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Fig. 3. High-level overview of the systems’s workflow
the dates of arrival and departure for hotels, and (iv) the providers and websites
to be examined. Bundles of such profiles are loaded by the scanner.
The scanner’s duty is to automatically browse the website of a given provider
to end up on certain product result pages. Our scraper implementations then
extract the relevant price information from these pages. Finally, we analyze the
extracted price information; this analysis of the collected data can point to cases
of price discrimination.
In the following sections, we describe each of these steps in more detail and
provide information about implementation aspects.
3.3 System Fingerprints
The real-world systems fingerprints that we use for our study are derived from
two data sources: First, a previous study [11] providing 385 fingerprints, primar-
ily from mobile devices, and second a project partner that has provided 15,000
fingerprints to a large browser gaming platform.
We re-grouped these fingerprints in order to identify the most and fewest
common feature values (see Sec. 3.1). This set of most common and uncom-
mon system fingerprints is suitable for our purpose: we need to include in our
study those systems that are frequently found in the wild, but we also need
to include special systems with unusual appearances in order to test how such
rare fingerprints may influence a product’s price. We also reduced the set, since
many features’ values were identical across several fingerprints. Following this
re-grouping and reduction, our set includes a total of 332 real-world fingerprints
for scanning Web platforms.
As noted above, a fingerprint may encompass manifold features of a system.
However, we include only the features listed below, which were gathered either
from the Browser Object Model (BOM) or the HTTP header, as these have been
proven to be common features used for browser fingerprinting [24, 4].
– AvailHeight determines available screen size height.
– AvailWidth determines available screen size width.
– ColorDepth stores the color depth of the display in bits.
– CookieEnabled stores a boolean value indication whether a website is al-
lowed to set cookies in the system’s browser.
– Height holds the height of the display screen in which the browser is located.
– Language determines the browser’s main language, usually stored in alpha-
2 code format of ISO 3166-1.
– Languages yields a list of supported languages where the first language
matches the main language.
– MimeTypes contains the object MimeTypeArray, which holds a list of all
MIME types the browser can work with. Each MimeType is represented by
a JSON array in our approach, which contains three items: i) description
(key: d), ii) suffix (key: f), and iii) type (key: n).
– PixelDepth indicates the bits per pixel of the display screen.
– Platform gives information about a system’s platform.
– Plugins provides the JavaScript object PluginArray containing all installed
browser plugins and is formatted the same way as MimeTypes, again including
a JSON array with items for description, suffix, and type.
– ProductSub represents the build number of the browser.
– UserAgent provides the user-agent string of a browser containing various
information about itself as well as the underlying system for which it was
built.
– Vendor depends on the type of browser and contains the name of its vendor.
– Width contains the width of the display screen in which the browser is
located.
In addition to all of these device-level features, we also need to consider the
network location (i. e., IP address), as this represents an important feature for
location analyses. We opted to use free proxy servers and rent VPN gateways
to enable a flexible routing of requests. As a result, we can issues queries from
different network locations and observe changes in responses.
3.4 Scanner
In our system design, the scanner implements a way to automatically scan web-
sites for price information. The scanner deploys different system fingerprints to
navigate in a self-acting manner through the target provider’s websites. In our
study, the navigation process can be subdivided into four steps:
1. loading the landing page,
2. filling out the search input,
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Fig. 4. Scanner components operation chart
3. ascertaining the travel destination, and
4. reaching the search results.
Figure 4 depicts the components of our scanner implementation. As discussed
above, we use real-world fingerprints to create fake user profiles and our scanner
uses proxies to forge its location so that we can evaluate whether the IP address
also plays a role in the whole process. Additional input for our core scanner
component comes from the provider websites that we seek to analyze and the
specific search parameters for the provider websites. During a run of the scanner,
the search parameters remain constant to obtain comparable results. Table 1
illustrates the implementation of the search parameters as a dictionary for hotel
booking websites. At the time this work was undertaken, we used up to four
travel targets for our search parameters. We determined search parameters such
that no public holiday or large events overlap with our chosen travel periods
in order to countervail possible price changes because of third-factor elements.
Additionally, we chose dates far in the future to ensure that sufficient products
were available.
The core component of the scanner is a customized version of the headless
browser PhantomJS that we use for automatic browsing on websites. The fin-
gerprint injection (i. e., the manipulation of the browser fingerprint of the Phan-
Table 1. Search parameters with example values
Parameter Name Example Value
travel target Berlin, Germany
check in day 27
check in month 5
check in year 2016
check out day 28
check out month 5
check out year 2016
number of adults 1
number of single rooms 1
number of double rooms 0
tomJS instance) is essential for our system design. Based on a set of fingerprint
features, the browser instance is altered to imitate the system that is represented
by the fingerprint. We combine out-of-the-box methods provided by PhantomJS
and JavaScript injection to fake the system fingerprint. Selenium includes the
WebDriver API and automates the driving of the browser as a real user would.
Through this extension, we gain access to additional features of PhantomJS that
allow us to replace identifying JavaScript objects. We achieve two design goals
using PhantomJS controlled via Selenium. First, we simulate authentic user be-
havior by navigating through the single steps of the website. Second, we thereby
create a deterministic behavior.
In summary, the real-world fingerprints, the proxies, the provider websites,
and the search parameters serve as input data for the scanner, which uses Se-
lenium to communicate with the custom PhantomJS browser via its extended
GhostDriver implementation.
3.5 Scraper
In general, the scraper extracts product information from selected websites. The
actual scraping is based on a Python implementation which is able to extract
information out of HTML and XML documents. It pulls the source code of
the target websites’ result pages as input and it extracts the required price
information from the HTML code. We locate the separate information in the
document via CSS-selectors, which need to be adjusted to the particular markup
structure of each target website. Moreover, we encountered many cases in which
the results are not displayed completely because they are usually loaded on
demand, e. g., when scrolling in a list of products. During this study, we found
three different attempts at presenting the results: (i) list with pagination, (ii) list
with a full scroll bar, and (iii) list with a partial scroll bar. Via Selenium, we
automated the navigation through the result page parts and extracted the price
information of the first 20 parts since processing additional assets and their
prices would exceed a functional limit. In the case of a pagination failure, our
scraper continues with the next accommodation.
When extracting price information from a website, one has to handle different
price presentation formats, currencies, and the meaning of the displayed prices.
Therefore, this data must be converted to a common format for use in subsequent
data analysis. The conversion is in principle a price normalization that results
in the price in Euro per night for a particular hotel and the total price in Euro
for rental cars. The conversion uses the latest available exchange rate. Note
that we update the exchange rate every time we start a new scan, where one
scan corresponds to one execution of the entire workflow of our system. With
this approach, we try to minimize the effect of exchange rate deviation on our
advertised price changes, particularly in revision scans. Finally, the scraper stores
all obtained information in a MySQL database. For reasons related to robustness,
all errors are caught and the scraping algorithm does not stop.
4 Evaluation
Based on the implementation of the scanning infrastructure, we performed sev-
eral empirical tests. We focus on two specific types of business: hotel booking
platforms and rental car suppliers.
4.1 Price Analyses
We scanned different providers for hotels and rental cars, namely Booking.com,
Hotels.com, Hrs.com, Orbitz.com, and Avis.com and conduct three kinds of anal-
yses: (i) location-based, (ii) fingerprint-based, and (iii) fingerprint-feature-based
price differentiation analyses.
First, we investigate location-based price differentiation. We consider several
countries (including France, Germany, the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and
the Netherlands) to determine how realistic it is that a higher or lower price for
the same asset will be obtained when requesting it from a different country. For
these countries, we obtained proxy servers or VPN gateways and re-routed our
search requests through these servers. The target websites will treat these as
search requests coming from the corresponding country. Furthermore, we ran-
domly picked six fingerprints from our set to repeat these scans with different
system configurations. Note that we focus in this analysis on hotel providers.
Second, we shed light on price differentiation based on system configurations.
This analysis is normalized to France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the
United States because we aim to highlight the systems’ fingerprints instead of
different originating countries and because we obtained complete result sets for
our scans for these countries. While we generally do not consider single finger-
prints for location-based analyses, we do so in this step. We used our set of 332
representative system fingerprints for the following analyses and utilized them
to disguise our scanner.
Third, these fingerprints are leveraged to create pairs in which one fingerprint
yields a high price and the other yields a low price for the same asset with
significant frequency. Intermediate fingerprints are then forged, simulating single
feature changes. By re-scanning the providers’ platforms, we harvest insights on
which specific system attributes affect online pricing policies.
Note that we are always searching for one person and one single night in the
case of hotel booking websites, hence, the search parameters described in Sec 3.4
are kept constant in the following analyses. After sending a search request, we
scrape the top offer prices per hotel for every provider as our ground data for
analysis. Finally, we repeat search requests and confirm that using the same
configuration reproduces the same prices, so that we can exclude randomness
and consider only reproducible price changes.
4.2 Location-based Price Differentiation
We sent search requests for different parameters, e. g., dates of arrival and de-
parture, to all accommodation providers, querying assets in four major cities,
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Fig. 5. Location-based price discrimination by provider
namely Los Angeles (USA), London (United Kingdom), Berlin (Germany), and
Tokyo (Japan). Each scan lasted about one hour in order to not overwhelm a
given site with queries. As a result of these scans, we obtained over 455,500 data
records, including an accommodation’s name, its provider, and the normalized
price in Euro.
Figure 5 shows boxplots for all providers, including the countries we re-
routed the search requests through, on the X-axis and the prices in Euro on
the Y-axis. Each box depicts the median, quartiles as well as minimum and
maximum values of prices for the corresponding country. Note that the prices
for each country refer to the same set of hotels in all cities, while there may be
differences when comparing providers, as some of them may not cooperate with
specific accommodations. This set is used for all location-based analyses and
contains only hotels that were found in all single scans for all configurations.
We omitted results with fewer than 1,000 responses per provider to avoid bias
and keep the results representative; therefore the number of countries varies in
Figure 5.
Booking.com We see that prices for accommodations vary mainly between e50
and e150, while the maxima extend up to e464.64. However, these high prices
are outliers and describe single cases, presumably luxury hotels. Interestingly,
there are significant differences between specific countries. While the Georgian
Republic, Germany and Russia show a similar range of product prices and similar
median values of e77.17, e79, and e79.03, the range of prices queried from a
French proxy is slightly higher, as is its median of e84.60. Still, the Netherlands
and Pakistan seem to get the highest prices with medians of e109 and e99.28,
respectively. Generally, low prices could be achieved using a proxy in the US;
the whole range of prices is between quartiles of e45.01 and e82.84. Note that
prices vary in similar ranges for all countries, illustrated by the box sizes, which
indicates that there is limited variance in prices and that all prices are generally
lower or higher for a specific country.
Hotels.com While medians are almost equal for assets requested from France,
Georgia (Georgian Republic) and Russia, France shows the greatest range of
prices. Prices tend to be in a lower range for Georgia and in a higher range for
Russia. These differences, however, are not significant in terms of location-based
price differentiation. In contrast, we see that Germany tends to get higher prices,
with a median of e106, which is very close to the third quartile (e107.90). At
the same time, the first quartile equals e70, meaning there is a wide range of
prices lower than the median. Again, prices for accommodations requested via
the USA proxy are generally lower. A median of e64.24 shows that low prices
are offered more frequently. Albeit generally lower, the range of prices is almost
the same as those for other countries.
Hrs.com Notably, all countries yield the same maximum value of e292.50, which
shows that one outlier achieves the same price regardless of which country.
France, Georgia, and the USA show almost the same median value of e79,
e82.95, and e79.50, though prices for France vary a little less than those for the
Georgian Republic and the United States. Germany and Russia tend to achieve
lower prices around medians of e69.69 and e66.58. In terms of price range,
however, Germany is comparable to France, while Russia shows the least range.
Orbitz.com At Orbitz.com we see extremely high-valued outliers up to e723.25,
but an almost equal distribution of medians and quartiles for all countries. The
first quartile varies only between e56.25 for Germany and e55.32 for the USA,
which could be a result of currency conversion. All medians are about e75 (±
e1) and only slightly higher for Germany, with a value of e77.24. Furthermore,
the third quartiles are around e108 (± e1). In total, we see an (almost) equal
price distribution for the first four countries of our set. We therefore did not
examine additional countries as we expected to see no differences.
Summary The result of our price differentiation analysis regarding location is
mixed: Not all providers seem to leverage price adjustments based on a user’s
location. On Orbitz.com, all examined countries were treated the same in our
study, giving no indication that this platform performs systematic price differ-
entiation. In contrast, we see for the other accommodation search providers a
medium variance of prices for the same assets. The USA received privileged prices
at Booking.com and Hotels.com, while the Netherlands and Pakistan were given
rather high prices at Booking.com, as was Germany at Hotels.com. At Hrs.com,
prices tend to be higher for requests from the Georgian Republic, whereas re-
quests from Germany and Russia likely achieve lower prices. Finally, we can
confirm the existence of price adjustment based on a user’s location, though
prices seem to vary within a limited range only.
4.3 Fingerprint-based Price Differentiation
We scanned the providers mentioned above instrumenting our fingerprint set
containing 332 system fingerprints. As a result, we obtained over 4,370,000 data
records, including an asset’s name, its provider, the used fingerprint, and the
normalized price in Euro within about 19 hours total. In this iteration the request
country has been set to a fixed parameter, as are the destination and dates of
travel. In particular, we tested how much prices vary for every single hotel when
the fingerprint of a request changes.
For every product (hotel or car) we obtained two lists: (i) fingerprint(s) which
yield a maximum price for this asset, and (ii) fingerprint(s) which achieve a min-
imum price for it. This results in almost 50,000 cases showing price differences,
which is only about 1.12 % of all scanning results.
For Booking.com, we recorded 20,868 cases, representing a share of 0.48 %.
Hrs.com and Orbitz.com show almost the same amount of cases with 9,786 and
9,600 both being a share of 0.22 % of all scanning results. Hotels.com produced
9,174 cases, meaning a share of 0.21 %. Finally, for Avis.com, we found 181
cases which are negligible as their share is below 0.01 %. Hence, we see that
fingerprint-based pricing is applied to different extents. While we found the ma-
jority of suspected price variation based on fingerprints at Booking.com, the
other three providers seem to deploy price differentiation at about the same in-
tensity. However, the share of suspicious cases that exhibit a high price variance
is rather small compared to the over 4 million scanned prices. We speculate that
these are individual cases, as a systematic price differentiation—or even price
discrimination—usually has a greater impact and is not limited to a small share
of cases.
Building on these initial findings, we perform a statistical significance anal-
ysis to further investigate how changing a system’s fingerprint affects prices.
For this purpose, we conduct the Friedman test [6, 7]. We used the Friedman
test because it is a parameter-free alternative to classical analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The result of both analysis variants is equivalent. An ANOVA re-
quires data in a normal distribution which we do not have. The Friedman test
does not necessarily need it and is therefore suitable for our significance anal-
ysis. We assembled nearly 600 hotels and a selection of 130 fingerprints that
yield price results for all of the assembled hotels, so that there is a scanned price
for every combination of fingerprint, hotel, request country, and provider. The
Friedman test calculates the significance of price changes resulting from these
fingerprints. By reducing the number of fingerprints to only those which occur
in all records of our data gathering, we guarantee the comparability between the
various characteristics.
However, before the Friedman test can be performed, additional cleaning of
the input data is necessary. Hotels with no free rooms must be removed. This
keeps the sample size (number of hotels) identical for each fingerprint, which is
important for statistical analysis. Altogether we use a data matrix including the
numeric hotel prices of the fingerprints as our input data. Each record has 130
columns for 130 fingerprints. The number of lines varies because some records
have more hotels. It should nevertheless be noted that most hotels are found
in all records. Due to proxy availability, we scanned Hotels.com from France,
Germany, and Romania, adding the United States for HRS.com and Orbitz.com.
Table 2. Excerpt of Median Hotel Prices as Result of the Friedman Test
Hotels HRS Orbitz
FP Fr De Ro Fr De Ro USA Fr De Ro USA
1 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
3 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
5 74 74 74 70.83 70.73 70.83 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
165 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
167 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
169 74 79.5 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
171 80 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
173 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
175 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
295 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
297 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
Unfortunately, we could not include Booking.com, as we did in the previous tests,
since the Web application changed during our research, making scraping hotel
prices impossible. In total we conducted eleven Friedman tests—one for each
combination of provider and country. In almost all cases, the p-value was lower
than 0.05, representing a significant difference between at least two fingerprints
in the corresponding subset. Only one test (Hotels.com from Romania) produced
a p greater than 0.05, presumably because the median values are all equal. We
calculated the median of medians directly for this single case instead of the post-
hoc tests we conducted for all other cases. Using a post-hoc test in this case could
possibly lead to false positives.
Table 2 shows an excerpt of the Friedman test results, showing the median
of each fingerprint for all combinations of provider and country. The raw results
of the Friedman test can be found in Appendix A. Note that only intra-column
comparisons are allowed as the sample sizes, i.e., the number of hotels, varies
between 397 and 594.
In these results, we see isolated price changes for Hotels.com regardless of
the requesting country. In fact, only a few fingerprints were found to be dis-
advantaged. With France as the request country, only one fingerprint (FP 171)
deviates by e6, and all other fingerprints yield a median price value of e74. For
Germany, there are three fingerprints (FP 105, FP 169, and FP 183) which de-
viate by e5.50 and e8, and for Romania all fingerprints yield the same median
price of e74. While these fingerprints resulted in reproducible and significant
price changes, the majority of prices remained the same or showed only little
variation for all other fingerprints. There is more significant variation of prices
among the fingerprints in the results from HRS.com. Generally, there are many
different prices in the median for every request country, which means that the
provider’s website responded with different prices for different fingerprints. How-
Table 3. Features share (price change cases)
Feature Share
httpHeader.acceptLanguage 14.57 %
navigator.languages 9.73 %
navigator.language 9.05 %
navigator.userAgent 7.95 %
screen.availHeight 6.90 %
navigator.vendor 6.77 %
screen.height 6.50 %
navigator.platform 6.31 %
screen.availWidth 6.17 %
screen.width 5.37 %
screen.colorDepth 4.63 %
navigator.productSub 4.26 %
screen.pixelDepth 4.04 %
navigator.plugins 3.97 %
navigator.mimeTypes 3.79 %
ever, almost all of these significant price differences are less than one Euro, so
currency conversions cannot be excluded as the cause. Only two fingerprints (FP
35 and FP 95) deviated by about e2.70 and e2.80. Again, these price differences
are significant according to the Friedman test, but as such deviations occur only
twice, it is questionable whether a price differentiation system exists.
These findings also apply for Orbitz, as there are also many price variances
for this site. But again, the differences among the prices is about one Euro or
less, and not a single fingerprint delivered a significant price difference of several
Euro. In fact, the price differences were found to be significant, but the reasons
for these differences may lie in rounding errors rather than being an indication
of systematic price discrimination.
4.4 Price-influencing Features
To investigate the individual cases of price changes due to system fingerprints,
we dissected those fingerprints that we suspected of price changes in the pre-
vious section. Although these are rare and individual cases, we aim to learn
which of these features are involved in price changes. We therefore created pairs
combining a fingerprint that resulted in a low price with a fingerprint that re-
sulted in a high price. Then we built intermediate fingerprints for all these pairs,
so-called morphprints, fading from one fingerprint to another by successively
changing their attribute values. The morphprints are naturally not real-world
fingerprints, they are only intended to compare single feature changes. Combin-
ing these morphprints (Mx) with the two original fingerprints (O1, O2) results in
a pack of feature changes. This matched-pairs design enables a precise analysis
of which feature values influence an asset’s price and in what way.
To find the correct order for feature replacement, we applied the informa-
tion gain algorithm, instrumenting the Kullback-Leibler divergence [9], to our
data set, revealing every feature’s importance to distinguish all data records. It
provides an order of how important and descriptive each feature is in relation
to our data. We instrument this output to set the order for successive feature
value replacement. In total, we created 111 morphprints and re-scanned accom-
modation websites, resulting in over 14,000 records. These additional scans took
about six hours each.
To test for reproducibility, every fingerprint and morphprint has been re-
scanned twice, and in the following discussion we only take into account those
cases of price changes that could be confirmed this way. For instance, if a change
of the platform attribute caused a price change of x, we switch this attribute back
to the old value and compare if the price change is −x. Changing the platform
attribute again should confirm this by resulting in a price change of x again.
Only these types of confirmed cases are considered in the following discussion in
order to exclude random price changes.
First, we examine which features affect an asset’s price most often. Second,
we shed light on how these features’ values influence online pricing.
Features While previous research identified a system’s user agent string to be
the top feature for fingerprinting (see Sec. 6), we see that a system’s language is
the most frequently occurring price changing feature in our empirical data set.
About one third of all discovered cases in our study include a language feature.
However, we confirm navigator.userAgent to be of particular importance, oc-
curring in about 8 % of all cases in our data set. The screen resolution as well
as the property navigator.vendor were found to be involved in about 6 % of
cases. This indicates that these attributes might only play a minor role in pric-
ing policies. Surprisingly, plugins and mime types are not often involved in price
changes, as they occurred in fewer than 4 % of all price changes. Usually these
attributes are considered to be highly personalized and should therefore have a
greater affect on price customization. This, however, cannot be confirmed on the
basis of our data. Table 3 lists each feature’s share in price changes.
Feature Values Given these findings, we now investigate which feature changes
result in a price difference. For the following analysis, we only consider repro-
ducible cases with just one single feature changing its value. Due to irregular
website responses more than one feature may have changed before scraping these
websites, but we eliminated these cases beforehand. Table 4 presents the feature
changes, their occurrences, and average price changes.
Language A change of the system’s language from ru (Russian) to de-de (Ger-
man) is seen most often, with an occurrence of about 14 %. Although this change
was frequently found to affect an asset’s price, the average price change is only
about 1.27 %.
Similarly, a language change from en-US (American English) to de (German)
could be found in about 11.87 % of all cases, changing asset prices about 8.88 %
(avg). In general, system language seems to be a price-influencing feature, oc-
curring in about half of all our cases. The average influence on prices, however,
is rather low.
User Agent As already indicated by previous experiments (see Table 3), the
content of a user agent string seems to affect asset prices. Although this feature
was involved in fewer cases than language settings, adjusting the user agent may
result in high price differences. For instance, switching from an Android 4.4.2
with the native Android browser to Windows 7 using Firefox changed hotel room
prices by about 17 %. Switching from a Mac OS X to an iPad (both with Safari)
affects the prices by about 15 % on average.
Although the user agent string seems to affect asset prices on platforms
leveraging fingerprinting, we cannot make a general claim about the specific user
agent or system that will always achieve low prices. From our data, one might
suggest that switching between mobile device and desktop computers may cause
the highest price changes, e. g., Android vs. Windows, but these cases are too
infrequent to generalize this result. However, a price difference in our results
attributable to switching user agents may well be caused by changing from a
mobile to a desktop, or the other way around.
Other Features Besides language settings and user agent, other features could
be related to price changes as well. The navigator.
productSub property was switched from 20030107 to None in about 4 % of
our cases, achieving an average price change of almost 0.06 %. Setting nav-
igator.vendor from Google Inc. to null and changing the screen resolu-
tion (screen.availHeight and screen.availWidth) resulted in negligible price
changes of about 0.06 %. Still, it is possible that these features affect asset prices
in some cases. But in the cases we found, they have only a subordinate role. This
also applies to navigator.plugins and navigator.
mimeTypes properties. These could not be matched to significant price changes
as they either rarely occur or have a negligible impact on asset prices.
Summary Our results show that language settings and user agent strings are the
most influential of all features. Changing these features to specific values may
increase the chance of receiving a lower price for online hotel bookings. Adjusting
other attributes, like vendor and screen resolution, may also affect online pricing
policies, but only to a small degree and in specific cases.
Although we cannot make a general claim about how certain feature values
should be set to optimize a search for the best price, our results indicate that
features which are closer to the user (like language settings, operating system,
and browser) have a greater impact when it comes to fingerprint-based pricing
policies.
Nevertheless, our findings—especially regarding single features and their values—
refer to individual cases in our data set. Although we have shown the statistical
Table 4. Most influencing features
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For better readability we present only operating system and browser instead of the complete user
agent string. The column Change represents the average price change in percent.
significance of these cases, we cannot claim a systematic third-degree price dif-
ferentiation or price discrimination. Small price changes of a few Eurocent may
be related to currency conversions, and price changes of more than one Euro are
rare and cannot be proven to be based on system fingerprinting.
4.5 Illustrating Examples
Examples where we explored custom pricing policies depending on the system
configuration are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. Both Tables show that the
same hotel at the same provider can have a significant difference in price with
different devices. The first example presents a case where an Android device
with the German language is much cheaper than an iPad configured in the Rus-
sian language. The second example illustrates a case where two Android devices
with different language settings can lead to different prices. However, these are
individual cases, since we were not able to identify a systematic price discrimina-
tion behavior. More examples of individual cases of online price discrimination
detected by our analysis framework are available online1.
5 Threats to Validity
Although we handled both the data collection and analysis phases thoroughly,
there are some limitations and threats to validity that we discuss below. First,
there are various sources that can influence prices and that is why we cannot be
completely sure to produce deterministic results with our method. However, in
the gathered data we see equal results for multiple scans that are done based on
the same input parameters – e. g., fingerprint, town and travel-date. This leads
to the assumption that our scans are deterministic.
All of our findings are not omni-valid for the whole Internet given that we
examined only a subset of all available accommodation booking platforms and
one rental car provider. Our results and conclusions are in general only valid for
our data set, and investigating other providers, product categories, countries, or
fingerprints may verify or refute them. However, our data and results derive from
realistic search requests and their valid responses, including real-world prices. To
foster research on this topic, we plan to publish all data collected during this
study.
Our analysis regarding location-based price differentiation sheds light on dif-
ferences in pricing on a per-country basis based on geolocation information of
IP addresses. The same might exist intra-nationally, so that users from the same
country but from different regions or cities may not get the same price for the
same product. This type of fine-grained analysis is not within the scope of this
work, as we mainly focus on fingerprint-based price differentiation.
With respect to our fingerprint-based analyses, the greatest threats to validity
are special offers and hidden price boosters or discounts. It may be the case that
1 https://rawgit.com/ananonymousauthor/examples/master/index.html
Table 5. First example for custom pricing policies depending on system configuration
S
ea
rc
h
Provider hotels.com hotels.com
Hotel NH Berlin Mitte NH Berlin Mitte
Price EUR 93.00 EUR 129.00
Acess Time 2016/05/22 01:16:57 2016/05/22 01:42:12
Request Country Germany Germany
Timezone Offset -120 -120
S
im
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ea
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s
navigator.userAgent
Mozilla/5.0
(Android; Mobile; rv:33.0)
Gecko/33.0 Firefox/33.0
Mozilla/5.0
(iPad; CPU OS 5 1
like Mac OS X)
AppleWebKit/534.46
(KHTML, like Gecko )
Version/5.1 Mobile/
9B176 Safari/7534.48.3
navigator.platform Linux armv7l Linux armv7l
navigator.vendor null Google Inc.
navigator.productSub 20100101 20030107
navigator.languages [”de”] [”ru”]
httpHeader.accept null null
httpHeader.accept language de ru
httpHeader.accept encoding null null
navigator.plugins [] []
navigator.mimeTypes [] []
navigator.cookieEnabled 1 1
screen.colorDepth 24 32
screen.pixelDepth 24 32
screen.width 360 1024
screen.availWidth 360 1024
screen.height 640 552
screen.availHeight 588 507
navigator.language de ru
some assets’ prices result from special offers or secret deals between the platform
provider and an accommodations owner. In a worst case scenario, a discount is
offered during only parts of our scan, so that fingerprints which are applied
early in the scanning order, for example, would get a lower special offer price
than all fingerprints later on receive. To remedy this threat, we applied a filter
to catch these cases and to ensure that only nonlinear price changes are taken
into account. For instance, if a hotel cost e100 per night for fingerprints 1 to
i, but only e80 per night for fingerprints i + 1 to n, it is possible that this
price change is due to a special offer. In contrast, if a hotel cost e100 per night
for fingerprints 1 to i, but e140 per night for fingerprints i + 1 to n, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the price has risen just because of our scanning, since
the first fingerprints simulate a high demand for this asset: the price could have
been increased as a reaction, meeting supply and demand. The exceeding of a
Table 6. Second example for custom pricing policies depending on system configuration
S
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Provider hrs.com hrs.com
Hotel Amelie Mitte Amelie Mitte
Price EUR 93.45 EUR 73.73
Acess Time 2016/05/22 19:39:51 2016/05/22 22:41:06
Request Country Germany Germany
Timezone Offset -120 -120
S
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d
C
li
en
t
F
ea
tu
re
s
navigator.userAgent
Mozilla/5.0
(Linux; Android 4.4.4;
GT-I9100G Build/KTU84P),
AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko)
Version/4.0 Chrome/33.0.0.0,
Mobile Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0
(Linux; U; Android 4.1.2;
ko-kr; SHV-E220S Build/JZO54K),
AppleWebKit/534.30
(KHTML, like Gecko)
Version/4.0
Mobile Safari/534.30
navigator.platform Linux armv7l Linux armv7l
navigator.vendor Google Inc. Google Inc.
navigator.productSub 20030107 20030107
navigator.languages [”de-DE”] [”ko-KR”]
httpHeader.accept null null
httpHeader.accept language de-DE ko-KR
httpHeader.accept encoding null null
navigator.plugins [] []
navigator.mimeTypes [] []
navigator.cookieEnabled 1 1
screen.colorDepth 32 32
screen.pixelDepth 32 32
screen.width 320 720
screen.availWidth 320 720
screen.height 534 51280
screen.availHeight 491 1177
navigator.language de-DE ko-KR
room quota may be another cause for such an artifact. Such cases are omitted to
exclude price changes based on special discounts and provider quotas. However,
we cannot ensure that we caught all potential external influence factors.
Another possible source of distortion may be the hotel providers’ booking
conditions. During the scraping process, we obtain the price offered at first sight
per accommodation regardless of room type and amenities, e. g., breakfast. It
is reasonable to assume that this is the best price for an offer as a lower price
attracts more customers than would a price for a premium suite including ameni-
ties. Hence, we assume that a provider’s platform would always list this best price
for all search requests. In practice, if a hotel offered standard rooms and pre-
mium rooms at different prices, and the standard room price is advertised for
the first search request, we presume that the prices shown in response to other
requests by our scan are also the advertised standard room price. This does not
apply to providers of rental cars, as there are fewer car types than there are pos-
sible room types. Although there are typically several room types available, it is
possible that during a scan, standard rooms are fully booked and only premium
suites are offered at a higher price. Such incidents are also detected by our filter
described above and excluded from our data set.
Although we normalized the accommodation prices to compensate changes
in currency exchange rates, there may be external factors we cannot consider
without insider knowledge. For instance, additional transaction fees for providers
may differ based on their bank or foreign exchange company.
With respect to our analyses of the ability of single features to increase or
decrease a price depending on their specific values, we have analyzed the most
striking fingerprints and created artificial morphprints. Due to the huge amount
of data, a complete analysis of all possible feature changes considering all possible
values in all possible combinations is not feasible. However, our findings are
derived from real-world data, though additional feature values may be seen in
the wild, meaning that additional value changes may occur, influencing online
pricing policies.
In this study, we instrumented browser fingerprints as well as proxy connec-
tions/VPN gateways to create profiles. While unlikely, it might be possible for
a cross-layer fingerprinting mechanism to discover a profile, e. g., if a user agent
shows a Windows machine, but a TTL (Time To Live) value in the IP header
analysis reveals a Linux system. Note that our results show clear price varia-
tions based on browser fingerprints, regardless of whether or not such a complex
mechanism was in place.
Future enhancements could take into account additional providers, as well as
more fingerprints, in order to enlarge the data set and gain additional insights.
In addition, a longitudinal analysis of possible price differentiation behavior by
several providers is another possible direction for future work. Including different
product categories also seems promising as we would be able to compare our
findings to other assets, like consumer goods purchased online, office supplies,
used and new cars, etc. As the data obtained so far is stored in a database and
our software is realized as a modular python package, we plan to publish both
so that this work may be expanded with other developers’ help.
6 Related Work
Several studies have revealed that online price discrimination is a common tech-
nique for online shop operators [2, 22, 23, 10, 28]. These studies, which we cite
below, are closely related to our work.
Hannak et al. recently analyzed several e-business websites which personalize
their content. They found that while personalization on e-business websites can
provide their users with advantages, aspects such as price customization, for ex-
ample, can also create disadvantages for those users [10]. Their results provide
evidence of price steering and discrimination practices in 9 of 16 analyzed web-
sites. Vissers et al. analyzed price discrimination in online airline tickets. Their
results, however, demonstrate that it was not possible to find any evidence for
systematic price discrimination on such platforms. This result may be due to the
fact that airlines utilize highly volatile pricing algorithms for their tickets [28].
Another empirical study was performed by Mikians et al.; they were among the
first to empirically demonstrate the existence of price discrimination [22]. With
this knowledge, they started another large-scale crowd-source study and they
were able to confirm that there are price differences in e-business based on lo-
cation [23]. One more recent study by Chen et al. takes a closer look at the
algorithmic pricing on Amazon Marketplace [2]. Our work concentrates on price
discrimination on hotel booking and car rental websites. In addition, we make
use of system fingerprints and analyze which fingerprinting features are the main
attributes causing price changes.
Web personalization work continues to improve the quality of Web search
requests and their personalized site content [18, 16]. Personalization is impor-
tant for our work because we analyze the levels on which system fingerprinting
methods are used for personalization. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to extract specific fingerprinting attributes which cause price changes.
Finally, system fingerprinting of clients is a conventional method wielded for
user tracking and identification, among other objectives [4, 24, 11, 30, 17, 8]. In
contrast to client fingerprinting, website fingerprinting is a method to attack
anonymity networks such as Tor by a passive observer [25, 29]. In this work, we
discuss our assumption that client fingerprinting methods are also utilized for
price discrimination. The economic fundamentals are extensively discussed by
several economists [27, 26]. Third-degree price differentiation is relevant to the
scope of this work (see Sec. 2.1).
Iordanou et al. presented a system to detect e-commerce price discrimina-
tion [13]. Although the authors faced a similar challenge, they did not inspect
fingerprint-based pricing policies explicitly. Additionally, our approach does not
require user interaction as we automatically scan provider websites and scrape
their contents.
Datta et al. found that user profile information is instrumented for gen-
der discrimination in the context of advertising [3]. Although this indicates the
existence of discrimination on the Internet, this study does not include price
differentiation.
Melicher et al. have shown that users are uncomfortable especially with in-
visible methods of user-tracking, such as price discrimination [21]. In contrast,
noticeable effects (e. g., advertising) are experienced as tolerable. This shows
the importance of secret price differentiation based on user behavior or system
fingerprints.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a means to search for online price differentiation in a
systematic way. To this end, we implemented a system capable of disguising itself
as different systems based on real-world fingerprints. Utilizing this system, we
sent search requests from several locations and systems to four accommodation
booking websites and one rental car provider. The returned prices of all found
assets (hotel rooms and cars) were examined regarding systematic price differen-
tiation behavior. We ensured that only reproducible cases of online pricing were
considered to exclude randomness and external factors.
Despite recent articles about possible price discrimination based on a user’s
system, we could not prove the existence of such a system for the examined
providers. Getting a lower (or higher) price for an asset based on a digital system
fingerprint is probably limited to individual cases. Our data show that such cases
are rare or may be the result of currency conversions. Nevertheless, it is possible
that price differentiation based on other attributes and factors is applied in the
wild, such as regional price discrimination.
Furthermore, we investigated single attributes to find which values will pro-
voke a reproducible price change. We found that a user’s language settings and
user agent (containing information about the operating system and browser) to
be the most promising attributes to manipulate when searching for an asset’s
best price. In contrast to other attributes like screen resolution, these features
represent a user’s choice and may, therefore, be more frequently instrumented for
fingerprint-based price discrimination. Though price discrimination does exist,
we found price fluctuations based on changed feature values to be individualized,
specific cases. Our study shows that systematic price differentiation is applied
by booking providers for locations but not for system fingerprints.
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A Friedman Test
Table 7: Median Hotel Prices as Result of the Friedman Test
Hotels HRS Orbitz
FP Fr De Ro Fr De Ro USA Fr De Ro USA
1 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
3 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
5 74 74 74 70.83 70.73 70.83 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
21 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
23 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
25 74 74 74 70.4 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
27 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
29 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
31 74 74 74 70.4 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
33 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
35 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 72.9 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
37 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
39 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
41 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
43 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
45 74 74 74 70 69.9 69.6 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
47 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
49 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
51 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
53 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
55 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
57 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
59 74 74 74 70.83 69.89 70.83 70.25 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
61 74 74 74 70.98 70.89 70.98 70.6 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
63 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
65 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
67 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
69 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
71 74 74 74 70.83 69.89 70.83 70.76 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
73 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
75 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
77 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
79 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
81 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
83 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
85 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
87 74 74 74 70.98 70.89 70.98 71.03 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
89 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
91 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
93 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
95 74 74 74 72.81 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
97 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
99 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
101 74 74 74 70.83 69.89 70.83 70.76 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
103 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
105 74 79.5 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
107 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
109 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
111 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
115 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
117 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
119 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
123 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
125 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
127 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
129 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
131 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
133 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
135 74 74 74 70.98 70.89 70.98 71.03 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
137 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
139 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 62.93 62.93
143 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
145 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
149 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
151 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
153 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
155 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
157 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
159 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
161 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
163 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
165 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
167 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
169 74 79.5 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
171 80 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
173 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
175 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
177 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
179 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
181 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
183 74 79.5 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
185 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
189 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
191 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
193 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
195 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
197 74 74 74 70.83 69.89 70.83 70.76 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
199 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
201 74 74 74 70.98 70.89 70.98 71.03 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
203 74 74 74 70.83 69.89 70.83 70.76 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
207 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
209 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
211 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
213 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
215 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
217 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
219 74 74 74 70.98 70.89 70.98 71.03 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
225 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
227 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
229 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
231 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
233 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
235 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
237 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
239 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
241 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
243 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
245 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
247 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
249 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
251 74 74 74 70.34 70.53 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
253 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
255 74 74 74 69.27 69.23 69.33 69.52 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
257 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
259 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
261 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
263 74 74 74 70.34 70.19 70.4 70.41 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
265 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
267 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
269 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
271 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
273 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
275 74 74 74 70.83 70.07 70.83 70.76 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
277 74 74 74 70.16 70.89 70.98 70.6 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
279 74 74 74 70.98 70.89 70.98 71.03 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
281 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
283 74 74 74 70.53 70.3 70.4 70.41 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
293 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 63.25 63.25 64.2 64.2
295 74 74 74 70 69.9 70 70.2 62.93 62.93 63.87 63.87
297 74 74 74 70.4 70.24 70.4 70.65 63.24 63.24 64.19 64.19
